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I. INTRODUCTION
“Fire, Aim, Ready!” Could this be the approach taken by the Internal
Revenue Service (the Service) in its attempt to finalize regulations,
proposed more than two years ago, that would specify a new method for
determining a shareholder’s taxable gains and losses in certain
reorganization transactions?1 Has the Service decided to elevate theory
over practicality without thinking through all of the ramifications of
these regulations?2 Finalizing these proposed regulations in their current
form may have serious unintended consequences.3 As drafted, they miss
their intended mark by inadvertently creating a loophole whereby some
shareholders could take immediate losses on some of their shares when,
in reality, they have an overall gain.4
Corporate acquisitions take many forms.5 Frequently, as in a
§ 368(a)(1)(B) reorganization, known as a “B” reorganization, the
shareholders of the acquired corporation exchange their stock solely for
stock of the acquiring corporation.6 Congress has long recognized that
such a swap of stock for stock should not trigger a tax because it results
in a mere change in form of a continuing investment.7 In many
corporate acquisitions, however, the shareholders of the acquired
corporation receive some cash in addition to stock of the acquiring

1. See Michael Bologna, IRS Remains Committed to Proposal on Basis Recovery
and Identification, 30 Tax Mgmt. Wkly. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 667 (May 30, 2011).
2. See id.
3. See Michael L. Schler, Rebooting Section 356: Part 2—The Regulations, TAX
NOTES TODAY, July 27, 2010, pt. X(E), available at LEXIS, 2010 TNT 143-5.
4. See id.
5. See Note, Three-Party Mergers: The Fourth Form of Corporate Acquisition,
57 VA. L. REV. 1242, 1242 (1971). Corporate acquisitions generally take the form of
statutory mergers, stock purchases, asset purchases, or three-party mergers. Id.
6. See John P. Steines, Policy Considerations in the Taxation of B
Reorganizations, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 993, 993 (1980). In order for a transaction to qualify
as a “B” reorganization, the exchange must involve solely stock, and after the exchange,
the acquiring corporation must be in control of the acquired corporation. Id.; I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1)(B) (2006). Section 368(c) defines the term control as “the ownership of
stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of the corporation.” I.R.C. § 368(c) (2006).
7. See Steines, supra note 6, at 993. Section 354(a)(1) provides that “[n]o gain or
loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization
are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in
such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.” I.R.C.
§ 354(a)(1) (2006).
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corporation.8 In this case, as to an exchanging shareholder who has a
gain on stock, Congress taxes the cash up to the gain present.9
Conversely, for a shareholder whose stock has lost value, the receipt of
cash in addition to stock of the acquiring corporation does not trigger a
tax loss because the cash in no way reflects a loss on a continuing stock
investment.10 For example, in a related context, a shareholder with a
built-in loss on his stock is still taxed on a dividend without an offset for
the loss because the investment continues.11 The loss nonrecognition rule
for corporate acquisitions appears straightforward. The rule is particularly
important in the current economic environment because many investors
presently own stock that has lost value since it was purchased.12
Surprisingly, in 2009, the Service issued proposed regulations interpreting
the loss nonrecognition rule in a way that, in practice, would permit
shareholders to recognize substantial losses, even in some cases where
shareholders have no overall loss on their shares of the acquired
corporation. 13 This Comment will explain why these proposed
2009 regulations set poor policy and are inconsistent with congressional
intent.14 But before turning to the abstract, it is helpful to consider the
following recent real world example.

8. The property or other money received in a corporate reorganization in addition
to the stock is commonly referred to as “boot,” which has been defined in Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary as “something to equalize a trade.” See WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 252 (15th ed. 2009); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 132 (10th ed. 1997). The types of reorganizations where boot is permitted
include (1) a statutory merger under § 368(a)(1)(A), (2) a subsidiary merger involving
the stock of the parent of the acquiring corporation under § 368(a)(2)(D), (3) a reverse
subsidiary merger involving the stock of the parent of the acquired corporation under
§ 368(a)(2)(E), (4) a practical merger—a “C” reorganization—involving the acquisition
by one corporation of substantially all of the assets of the acquired corporation in
exchange for the acquiring corporation’s voting stock, and (5) a transfer of assets by one
corporation to a corporation controlled by the transferor corporation or its shareholders
under § 368(a)(1)(D). See I.R.C. § 368 (2006); D. Bret Carlson, Boot at the Corporate
Level in Tax-Free Reorganizations, 27 TAX L. REV. 499, 503 (1972).
9. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E); I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) (2006).
10. See Steines, supra note 6, at 993; I.R.C. § 356(c) (2006).
11. See Nickolas J. Kyser, The Long and Winding Road: Characterization of Boot
Under Section 356(a)(2), 39 TAX L. REV. 297, 297–98 (1984); I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (2006).
12. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
13. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
14. See infra Parts IV–V.
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II. THE PROPOSED 2009 REGULATIONS IN ACTION:
THE DIVX-SONIC MERGER
On Friday, October 8, 2010, Sonic Solutions (SNIC) acquired DivX
(DIVX), a San Diego digital media and video developer, with the hopes
of expanding the web-based infrastructure for Internet users to stream
movies and television shows online.15 Each share of DIVX common
stock outstanding was valued at approximately $9.62 and was converted
into the right to receive 0.514 of a share of SNIC common stock plus
$3.75 cash.16 Many DIVX shareholders who purchased their shares after
2008 realized a gain on their shares in the merger.17 DIVX shareholders
who purchased their shares before 2008, however, were not so fortunate
and were forced to realize a loss on their shares.18 In the merger, each
shareholder should have recognized any realized gain19 on his DIVX
shares to the extent of the cash received and deferred any losses under
Internal Revenue Code § 356 because each DIVX share was exchanged
for some cash and a portion of a SNIC share.20
Suppose, however, that instead of recognizing this gain, a shareholder
who held stock with aggregate unrealized gain in DIVX was able to
avoid recognition of any gain and yet still recognize a loss for the current
year. Although such a windfall for the shareholder would be unwarranted,
it may nevertheless be achievable under the recent proposed 2009
regulations dealing with § 356.21 For example, consider a DIVX
15. See Press Release, Sonic Solutions, Sonic Completes DivX Acquisition (Oct.
8, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916235/000114420410
053625/v198920_ex99-1.htm.
16. Sonic Solutions, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Oct. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916235/000114420410053625/v1989208k.htm;
DivX, Inc. Historical Prices, DAILY FIN., http://www.dailyfinance.com/quote/unknown/divxinc/divx/historical-prices?source=esadlftna10001 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
17. See DivX, Inc. Historical Prices, supra note 16. For instance, on March 9, 2009,
the DIVX share price closed at $4.15 per share. Id. Those who purchased shares at this price
realized a gain of approximately $5.47 per share in the merger—$9.62 - $4.15 = $5.47. See
id.
18. See id. For instance, on November 6, 2007, the DIVX share price closed at
$15.89 per share. Id. Those who purchased shares at this price would have suffered a
loss of approximately $6.27 per share in the merger—$9.72 - $15.89 = -$6.27. See id.
Some shareholders may have experienced even greater losses. See id. For instance, on
November 28, 2006, the DIVX share price closed at $31.36 per share. Id. Those who
purchased shares at this price would have suffered a substantial loss of approximately
$21.74 per share in the merger—$9.62 - $31.36 = -$21.74. See id.
19. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 37. A taxpayer realizes a gain or loss when
the taxpayer experiences some change in circumstance such that he or she might have to
take the gain or loss into account. Id. A taxpayer recognizes a gain or loss when the
taxpayer is required to take the realized gain or loss into account. Id. The taxpayer may
realize a gain or loss without recognizing it but may not recognize a gain or loss without
realizing it. Id.
20. See Press Release, Sonic Solutions, supra note 15; I.R.C. § 356 (2006).
21. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F).
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shareholder who, prior to the DIVX-SNIC merger, held 750 shares of
DIVX common stock purchased on November 6, 2007, at $15 per share
with a total value of $7215 and total cost basis or purchase price of
$11,250.22 The DIVX shareholder also held another 1174 shares of the
same DIVX common stock purchased on March 9, 2009, at $4.10 per
share with a total value of $11,293.88, but with a total cost basis of
only $4813.40.23 Pursuant to the terms of the reorganization, the DIVX
shareholder received approximately 988.94 shares of SNIC voting common
stock valued at approximately $11.42 per share and $7215 in cash in
exchange for the shareholder’s 1924 shares of DIVX common stock.24
Rather than allocate the $3.75 to each of the DIVX shares as was done
in the actual DIVX-SNIC merger, assume that in the exchange, the DIVX
shareholder was permitted to allocate all consideration received in the
form of SNIC stock to his low-basis ($4.10-per-share) DIVX stock and
all of the cash consideration to his high-basis ($15-per-share) DIVX stock.25
Assume further that the concurrent exchanges of the DIVX shareholder’s
low-basis and high-basis DIVX shares were treated as two separate and
distinct transactions. Because the exchange of the shareholder’s highbasis ($11,250) DIVX stock for cash ($7215) would take the form of an
ordinary stock sale, assuming the cash did not have the effect of a
dividend, the shareholder would recognize a $4035 loss on these shares,
which the shareholder could then use to directly reduce current taxable
income.26 On the other hand, the exchange of the shareholder’s low22. See DivX, Inc. Historical Prices, supra note 16. The cost basis of stocks or
bonds is typically the purchase price plus any costs of purchase, such as commissions
and recording or transfer fees. See I.R.C. § 1012 (2006); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUBLICATION 551: BASIS OF ASSETS 2 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p551.pdf.
23. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 22, at 2.
24. 0.514 x 1924 DIVX shares surrendered = approximately 988.94 SNIC shares
received; $3.75 x 1924 DIVX shares surrendered = $7215 cash received. See Sonic
Solutions, supra note 16, at 2.
25. See id.; DivX, Inc. Historical Prices, supra note 16.
26. $7215 amount realized - $11,250 basis = $4035 loss. Code § 302(a) states that
“[i]f a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of section 317(b)), and if
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated
as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock.” I.R.C. § 302(a)
(2006). Section 302(b)(1) then goes on to specify that “[s]ubsection (a) shall apply if the
redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.” Id. § 302(b)(1). A taxpayer
experiences a capital loss when the taxpayer sells an investment at less than the purchase
price or adjusted basis. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 704–05. Although losing
money on an investment is never desirable, a taxpayer can recoup a percentage of his
true losses by deducting these capital losses from his taxable income, thereby reducing
his tax liability. See id. These capital losses may be used with no limits to reduce capital
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basis ($4813.40) DIVX stock for SNIC stock ($11,293.88) would be
treated as an exchange to which nonrecognition of gain would apply
because, in form, it would appear to be a § 354 stock-for-stock exchange
pursuant to a reorganization.27 The shareholder would defer the realized
but unrecognized $6480.48 gain28 on these shares until subsequently
selling the 1174 SNIC shares received in the exchange.29 Thus, even
though in substance the exchange as a whole resulted in the
shareholder’s realizing a gain of $2445.48,30 by transaction-splitting
the shareholder was able to structure the form of the exchange so as to
recognize an immediate $4035 loss and defer a $6480.48 gain until some
undetermined subsequent sale date.31 When taking into account the time
gains, but the amount by which ordinary income may be reduced by capital losses is
limited to $3000. Id.
27. See I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (2006) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or
securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another
corporation a party to the reorganization.”).
28. $11,293.88 amount realized - $4813.40 basis = $6480.48 gain.
29. See I.R.C. § 358(a) (2006). The shareholder takes an exchanged basis, and his
new basis in these SNIC shares becomes $4813.40—$4813.40 old basis in DIVX shares
surrendered less $0 cash received plus $0 gain recognized. See id. Section 358(a)
preserves the unrealized gain by providing that in an exchange to which §§ 351, 354,
355, 356, or 361 applies:
Nonrecognition property (1) The basis of the property permitted to be received
under such section without the recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as
that of the property exchanged—
(A) decreased by—
(i) the fair market value of any other property (except money)
received by the taxpayer,
(ii) the amount of any money received by the taxpayer, and
(iii) the amount of loss to the taxpayer which was recognized on such
exchange, and
(B) increased by—
(i) the amount which was treated as a dividend, and
(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer which was recognized on such
exchange (not including any portion of such gain which was treated
as a dividend).
Other property (2) The basis of any other property (except money) received by
the taxpayer shall be its fair market value.
Id. Note that on the Sonic Solutions side of the transaction, Sonic Solutions takes a
transferred basis under § 362(b). See id. § 362(b) (“If property was acquired by a
corporation in connection with a reorganization to which this part applies, then the basis
shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor. This subsection shall not
apply if the property acquired consists of stock or securities in a corporation a party to
the reorganization, unless acquired by the exchange of stock or securities of the
transferee (or of a corporation which is in control of the transferee) as the consideration
in whole or in part for the transfer.”); see also McDonald’s Rests. of Ill., Inc. v. Comm’r,
688 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating the Commissioner ruled that a transfer of
assets at issue was a statutory merger or consolidation, not a taxable acquisition).
30. ($11,293.88 SNIC stock + $7215 cash = $18,508.88 received) - ($11,250 basis
DIVX stock + $4813.40 basis DIVX stock = $16,063.40 surrendered) = $2445.48 gain.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 25–30.
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value of money, the shareholder could reap a significant benefit from
this transaction because the shareholder could use the amount otherwise
presently taxable to invest currently in other interest-earning projects.32
The DIVX-SNIC merger example exposes a loophole in the manner
by which the new proposed 2009 regulations address the issue of loss
recognition when corporate reorganizations involve the exchange of
shares with their tax basis exceeding their fair market value (loss shares)
solely for cash.33 If they become final regulations, they will permit
immediate recognition of losses, rather than deferral, realized upon the
surrender of such shares.34 Ordinarily, § 356 provides that if a shareholder
surrenders his stock in exchange for other stock, and the exchange would
go unrecognized under § 354 were it not for the fact that the shareholder
also receives other property or money (boot) in addition to the stock,
then the shareholder recognizes gain, but not loss, to the extent of the
fair market value of the boot received.35 However, the loss nonrecognition
rule of § 356 is circumvented if a shareholder can arbitrarily allocate
solely cash to his loss shares in a reorganization and treat this exchange
32. See IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE 18 (2010). The concept of the time
value of money is that “a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow.” Id. This
is because a taxpayer can always invest money and earn interest, thereby receiving more
money in the future as a return on the investment. See id.; see also KLEIN ET AL., supra
note 8, at 40 (noting that the simple advantage of tax deferral is “use in the interim of the
amount that would otherwise have been presently paid in taxes”).
33. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F).
34. See The Allocation of Consideration and Allocation and Recovery of Basis in
Transactions Involving Corporate Stock or Securities, 74 Fed. Reg. 3509, 3512
(proposed Jan. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter Proposed 2009
Regulations].
35. Section 356(a)(1) provides:
(1) If—
(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the fact that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of property
permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without recognition of gain
but also of other property or money,
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not
in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other
property.
I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) (2006). Section 356(c) then addresses losses, specifying:
(c) If—
(1) section 354 would apply to an exchange or section 355 would apply to
an exchange or distribution, but for the fact that
(2) the property received in the exchange or distribution consists not only
of property permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without the
recognition of gain or loss, but also of other property or money,
then no loss from the exchange or distribution shall be recognized.
Id. § 356(c).
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as a separate transaction, as is permitted under the proposed 2009
regulations.36
After Part I’s introduction, Part II of this Comment illustrates the type
of impact the proposed 2009 regulations will have on transactions where
a shareholder who is a party to a corporate reorganization exchanges his
target company’s (target) shares for an acquiring company’s (acquiring)
shares and boot, and the shareholder decides to allocate solely boot to
some of the target loss shares.37
Part III compares how the final 2006 regulations currently treat a
shareholder’s loss with how the proposed 2009 regulations will treat the
same loss.38
Part IV asserts that Congress intended § 356 to apply in all cases in
which a shareholder exchanges target stock for both stock and cash in a
reorganization in order to ensure mandatory deferral of losses that lack
economic reality.39
Part V discusses the present policy reasons for rejecting the proposed
2009 regulations.40 The proposed 2009 regulations would open up a
loophole that could significantly increase the current federal budget deficit
and operate in a manner inconsistent with the Obama administration’s
recent endeavor to close tax loopholes by codifying the “economic
substance” doctrine in § 7701(o).41
36. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 15–36.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See infra Part V.
41. See infra Part V. In addition to opening up a loophole in the tax code, the
proposed 2009 regulations provide an interpretation of § 356 that the Treasury
Department may not even be authorized to assert. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ.
& Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 (2011). In the recent Supreme
Court case Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, the
Court found that the Treasury Department has the authority to interpret ambiguities in
the Code if the interpretation is reasonable as per the requirements of the two-part
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. test. See id.; Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). In Mayo,
the Treasury Department did not consider medical school residents who worked full time
to fall within the student exception under I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10), which exempts students
from taxation on wages earned while in the employ of the school. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at
715–16; I.R.C. § 3121(b)(10) (2006). The Court held that the Treasury Department’s
rule excluding students who worked more than forty hours per week from the student
exception was a reasonable construction of congressional intent. See Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at
715–16.
Section 356, unlike the student exception under § 3121(b)(10) addressed in Mayo, is
not ambiguous in requiring that losses go unrecognized. See I.R.C. § 356(c) (2006).
Additionally, legislative authority and case law suggest that Congress did not intend
§ 356 to be an optional Code section. See infra Part IV. Thus, the Treasury Department’s
interpretation of § 356 that enables immediate loss recognition under the proposed 2009
regulations may not be authorized under the step-one ambiguity requirement of Chevron
and may not be a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent under the step-two
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Part VI proposes to modify the proposed 2009 regulations so as to
require pro rata allocation of boot or basis-shifting that would effectively
close the loophole created by the regulations.42 A modification requiring
pro rata allocation would conform more closely to congressional intent
requiring mandatory § 356 application and loss deferral and would more
consistently comport with the Obama administration’s recent codification of
the economic substance doctrine.43
Finally, Part VII concludes that the Treasury Department should
modify the proposed 2009 regulations to require pro rata allocation of
boot when a shareholder exchanges target stock for both acquiring stock
and boot in a reorganization so as to more closely align the regulations
with public policy and congressional intent to defer losses.44
III. THE FINAL 2006 REGULATIONS AND THE PROPOSED
2009 REGULATIONS
Currently under the final 2006 regulations, a shareholder may dictate
the terms of his exchange in a reorganization.45 A shareholder may
allocate the consideration received from the acquiring company to
his target company shares in the manner of his choosing as long as the
terms are economically reasonable. 46 Therefore, consistent with the
proposed 2009 regulations, the shareholder can surrender some shares of
target stock in the reorganization for acquiring stock while surrendering
other shares solely for cash or other boot.47 If the reorganization involves
the exchange of the shareholder’s target shares for both stock and boot,
§ 356 ordinarily applies.48 In the case of a loss, however, the tax
reasonability requirement of Chevron. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. Nevertheless,
the Court in Mayo supports the position that the Treasury Department’s interpretation of
the Code should be given broad deference when the interpretation clarifies important
individual rights and duties and ensures the efficiency of statutory implementation. See
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713–15.
42. See infra Part VI.
43. See infra Part VI.
44. See infra Part VII.
45. See Determination of Basis of Stock or Securities Received in Exchange for, or
with Respect to, Stock or Securities in Certain Transactions; Treatment of Excess Loss
Accounts, 71 Fed. Reg. 4264, 4265 (Jan. 26, 2006) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)
[hereinafter Final 2006 Regulations].
46. Id.; see infra note 56.
47. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 252; Proposed 2009 Regulations, supra note
34, at 3512.
48. See I.R.C. § 356 (2006). Section 356 provides that losses go unrecognized
while gains are recognized only to the extent of the lesser of boot received or gain
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treatment is unclear.49 Section 356 requires nonrecognition of losses, but
when all of the loss shares are surrendered solely for cash, the shareholder
winds up with no acquiring shares with which to preserve the loss.50
Three available alternative tax treatments are (1) permanent disallowance,51
(2) immediate recognition,52 and (3) deferral.53 The final 2006 regulations
realized. Id. Applying § 356 to a stock-for-stock exchange in which a gain is realized,
no gain would be recognized because no boot is received. See id. The gain is deferred
by designating the basis of the surrendered shares to be the basis of the shares acquired.
See id. § 358(a). Applying § 356 to an exchange of stock solely for cash in which a gain
is realized, the amount of gain recognized is simply equal to the gain realized. See id.
§ 356. Because no gain is deferred, the basis of the acquired shares is equal to its fair
market value on the date of the exchange. See id.
49. See Schler, supra note 3; Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265.
50. See Patrick C. Gallagher, Report on Final Regulations Regarding Allocation of
Basis Under Section 358 and Related Matters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 14, 2007, pt.
III(C), available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 241-18; see also I.R.C. § 358(a) (codifying the
general rule for the nonrecognition of property regarding basis to distributes).
Ordinarily, loss deferral is accomplished in a reorganization to which § 356 applies by
assigning the excess basis of the loss shares over the boot received to the shares received
in the reorganization, such that the deferred loss is recognized upon a later sale of the
stock received. See id. When a loss is realized upon exchanging stock solely for cash,
however, this is impossible because the basis of cash is fixed at its face value and no
shares are received to assign excess basis to. See Gallagher, supra, pt. IV(G). In such a
case, without some mechanism to address this problem, the shareholder’s loss will end
up permanently disallowed. See id.
51. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G). Permanent disallowance would
render an inequitable result to shareholders who would be deprived of a tax loss benefit
due to a change in corporate form that was outside of their control. See id. In Coyle
v. United States, a case in which the shareholder transferred shares of a corporation he
controlled to a corporation that his sons owned, the court rejected such a draconian
result. 415 F.2d 488, 493 (4th Cir. 1968). Due to family attribution rules, the
shareholder had control of the corporation not only before the transaction through his
own shares but after the transaction through his sons. Id. at 490. Therefore, the
redemption was deemed essentially equivalent to a dividend. See id. at 493. As a result,
the shareholder could not treat the redemption as a recovery of basis on his shares even
though he no longer held the shares and thus could not recover his basis at a later date.
See id. The court, however, took the position that the taxpayer should not permanently
lose his tax basis, holding that it was “clear that taxpayer’s basis w[ould] not disappear.”
Id. At a minimum, a taxpayer should be able to preserve his basis even if it means
adding it to different property. See id. Thus, the basis could either be added to the sons’
shares or added to the shareholder’s remaining shares in the corporation. Id.
52. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(3). Section 356 disallows immediate
loss recognition. I.R.C. § 356(c). Therefore, immediate loss recognition would be
permissible only if § 356 could be avoided. See id. The proposed 2009 regulations
allow shareholders to do just this by allowing them to split transactions otherwise falling
under the purview of § 356 into separate § 354 stock-for-stock and § 302 stock-for-boot
exchanges. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. F; Proposed 2009 Regulations, supra note 34, at
3512; infra text accompanying notes 71–81.
53. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2). Loss deferral is typically
accomplished by adding basis equal to the amount of the loss realized but not recognized
to the shares received so as to be recognized later upon subsequent sale of the shares.
See id. A problem surfaces when only boot is received because the shareholder does not
receive any acquiring shares in the exchange to which basis could be added. See id.
Nevertheless, in an overall transaction in which target stock is exchanged for both
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unfortunately do not adopt any of the three alternative tax treatments,
rendering guidance unclear.54 The Service’s clarification on this
issue is of significance to shareholders who may want to exploit the
ambiguity as a tax loophole or who simply desire certainty as to the tax
consequences of their reorganization exchanges.55
According to these final 2006 regulations, a shareholder has discretion
in setting the share allocation terms in a corporate reorganization as long
as they are economically reasonable.56 A shareholder could, for example,
allocate both acquiring stock and cash—or other boot—to each of his
target shares.57 Alternatively, a shareholder could allocate all of the
acquiring stock received to some of his target shares and all of the boot
received to his remaining target shares. 58 However, even if the
shareholder artificially separates the stock and boot received from the
acquiring corporation when allocating this consideration among his
target shares, the final 2006 regulations still view the shareholder’s
surrender of all of his target shares in exchange for acquiring stock and
boot as part of a single transaction.59 Therefore, § 356 applies because
the transaction, as a whole, involves the exchange of target shares for
both acquiring shares and boot.60 But according to the final 2006
acquiring stock and cash, regardless of how the shareholder may choose to allocate his
target shares, the shareholder still winds up with some shares in the acquiring corporation
to which basis could be added for loss preservation and deferral purposes. See id. Under
these circumstances, a taxpayer could preserve the loss by allocating the boot pro rata to
each target share surrendered regardless of its basis or by basis-shifting. See id.; infra
Part VI.
54. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
55. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265; Schler, supra note 3, pt.
X(E), (I). Although the uncertainty may leave open loopholes in the law for taxpayers, it
is better for taxpayers to trade potential loopholes for certainty in the tax code so as to
avoid postfiling challenges. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41
CONN. L. REV. 431, 436 (2008).
56. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265. The final 2006 regulations
do not define what is “economically reasonable.” See id. However, an example is added
to the Income Tax Regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(d), Example 4, in which a
shareholder exchanged one class of target shares with a fair market value of $100 for
acquiring stock worth $100 and another class of target stock worth $100 for $100 in
cash. Id. at 4269. The example states that this allocation is economically reasonable,
indicating that an allocation is economically reasonable if the value of the target stock is
the same as the value of the acquiring stock or cash, or both, for which the target stock is
exchanged. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4269; Treas. Reg. § 1.3561(d), Ex. (4) (2006); Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
57. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 4265–66.
60. See id.; I.R.C. § 356 (2006).

1407

GUINN POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

1/4/2012 9:27 AM

regulations, § 356 applies to each portion of the transaction separately.61
No gain is recognized on the share-for-share exchange because no cash
boot is received.62 There is, however, recognized gain to the full extent
of any realized gain in a share-for-cash exchange because the realized
gain will always be less than the boot received on these shares.63 No
loss is ever recognized as per the requirements of § 356.64
By analyzing the exchange as a whole to determine § 356 applicability,
the final 2006 regulations ensure that shareholders are unable to avoid
§ 356 treatment by simply splitting their transactions into stock-for-stock
and stock-for-cash exchanges.65 Nevertheless, the preamble to these
regulations acknowledges that when the stock-for-cash portion of an
exchange results in an unrecognized loss under § 356, problems may
arise because the shareholder will be left with no shares from this
portion of the exchange on which to defer the loss.66 The preamble’s
response to this problem offers little comfort to shareholders.67 It states
only that the Service may permit shareholders to recognize a loss when a
61. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265–66. In other words, the
treatment of the gain or loss on the stock-for-stock exchange under § 356 is determined
separately from the treatment of the gain or loss on the stock-for-cash exchange under
§ 356. See id.
62. See I.R.C. § 356. Under § 356, gain is recognized only to the extent of the
boot received. Id. Thus, when the shareholder receives only stock and no boot on this
portion of the transaction, the shareholder does not recognize any gain. See id.
63. See id. This is because if only cash is received in exchange for the target
shares, and receipt of cash, unlike acquiring stock, is taxable to the extent of the gain
under § 356, all of the gain should be currently taxable. See id.
64. See id. For example, assume that a shareholder owns five shares of target
stock with a basis of $10 per share and five shares of target stock with a basis of $30 per
share. Each target share has a fair market value of $20. In a reorganization, the
shareholder surrenders his stock in target for twenty shares of acquiring stock worth $5
and $100 in cash. The shareholder allocates the twenty acquiring shares to his low-basis
target shares and allocates the $100 to his high-basis target shares. Under the final 2006
regulations, because the shareholder receives both stock and cash in exchange for the
shareholder’s target stock, § 356 applies to both the low-basis and high-basis stock
exchanges, even though the low-basis shares are exchanged solely for shares and the
high-basis shares are exchanged solely for cash. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note
45, at 4265–66; I.R.C. § 356. Once § 356 is triggered, the low-basis target stock for
acquiring stock exchange is analyzed separately from the high-basis target stock for cash
exchange to determine the tax treatment of these exchanges under § 356. See Final 2006
Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265–66. Despite the realization of a gain of $50 on his
low-basis target shares, the shareholder will not recognize any gain on these shares
because he received only acquiring stock ($0 boot) in exchange for these shares. See
I.R.C. § 356. Moreover, despite the realization of a loss of $50 on his high-basis shares,
the shareholder will not recognize any of the loss because loss is not recognized under
§ 356. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265–66; I.R.C. § 356.
65. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265–66; Schler, supra note 3,
pt. X(E).
66. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265; Gallagher, supra note 50,
pt. IV(G).
67. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
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class of stock is exchanged solely for cash.68 Use of the word may rather
than shall suggests that recognition of the realized loss is far from
certain.69 These regulations therefore leave shareholders without a clear
sense of the taxability of realized losses incurred when their shares are
exchanged solely for cash in a corporate reorganization.70
The proposed 2009 regulations do not clarify the tax treatment of the
loss when a shareholder exchanges loss shares solely for cash under
§ 356.71 Instead, they provide a conspicuous loophole for shareholders
to avoid § 356 application.72 Similar to the final 2006 regulations, the
proposed 2009 regulations enable a shareholder to allocate consideration
received from an acquiring corporation to his target shares on a shareby-share basis.73 Unlike the final 2006 regulations, however, each share
of target stock is viewed as a separate unit of exchange rather than a
piece of the broader overall exchange.74 Therefore, if the shareholder of
a target company chooses to allocate solely acquiring shares to some of
his surrendered target shares, solely cash to other target shares, and both
acquiring shares and cash to yet other target shares, then the target
shares exchanged solely for acquiring shares will be governed by § 354,
the target shares exchanged solely for cash by § 302, and the target
shares exchanged for both by § 356.75 If a shareholder exchanges his
target stock for both stock and cash in the acquiring corporation and the
cash received does not have the effect of a dividend,76 then the
68. See Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265.
69. See id.; Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
70. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
71. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
72. See id. A “loophole” is a way for taxpayers to decrease their tax liability “in
contravention of the intention of the legislator . . . without breaching specific statutory
duties.” See Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in the United
States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 593 (Supp. 2010) (quoting Assaf Likhovski, The Duke
and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 954 n.1 (2004)); Mik Shin-Li, Note, Strictly Wrong as a Tax
Policy: The Strict Liability Penalty Standard in Noneconomic Substance Transactions,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2012 (2009).
73. See Proposed 2009 Regulations, supra note 34, at 3512.
74. See id.
75. See id.; I.R.C. §§ 302(a)–(b), 354(a), 356 (2006).
76. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(2). Another problem with the immediate loss recognition
allowed under the proposed 2009 regulations is that although some taxpayers may be
able to take advantage of the regulations, others may not. See Schler, supra note 3, pt.
X(F). If a shareholder exchanges target stock for both cash and acquiring stock, and the
cash has the effect of a dividend, then § 302(d) applies when the shareholder allocates
solely stock to some of his target shares and solely cash to his other target shares in order
to avoid § 356 treatment. See I.R.C. § 302(d) (2006) (“[I]f a corporation redeems its
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shareholder simply needs to allocate solely stock to some of his target
shares surrendered and solely cash to his other shares in order to avoid
§ 356 treatment and recognize an immediate loss on some of his shares.77
stock (within the meaning of section 317 (b)), and if subsection (a) of this section does
not apply, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution of property to which section
301 applies.”); id. § 301(c)(1) (“That portion of the distribution which is a dividend (as
defined by section 316) shall be included in gross income.”). This would result in
dividend treatment for the entire amount of cash received, regardless of whether or not
the target shares are loss shares. See id.
For example, assume a shareholder has ten shares of target stock, each with a basis of
$100 and a fair market value of $50. Assume further that target has considerable
earnings and profits. The shareholder exchanges his ten target shares for $200 in cash
and five shares of acquiring stock, each worth $60. The shareholder then allocates the
$200 received to four of his target shares surrendered and the five acquiring shares
received to his other six target shares surrendered in order to avoid § 356 treatment.
Under § 302(d), the full $200 received on the shares exchanged solely for cash would
receive dividend treatment even though the shareholder actually suffered a $200 loss on
those shares upon their surrender. See id. § 302(d).
Unlike § 356, which taxes only the lesser of gain realized or cash received, § 302(d)
leads to a tax on the dividend to the extent of the earnings and profits under § 301. See
§ 301(c)(1). Under § 354, the shareholder would still maintain a deferred $300 loss on
the other six target shares exchanged solely for stock, as inherent in a higher exchange
basis attaching to the acquiring shares received. See id. §§ 354(a), 358(a). Overall, this
result would be undesirable for the shareholder. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F). It
would be more beneficial for the shareholder to allocate both cash and stock to his target
shares on a pro rata basis. See id. If done, the tax on the cash received would at least be
limited under § 356 only to the amount of any gain recognized, if any, even when its
receipt has the effect of a dividend. See id.; I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (“If an exchange is
described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution of a dividend (determined
with the application of section 318(a)), then there shall be treated as a dividend to each
distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in excess
of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation
accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized
under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.”).
77. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F). For example, assume a shareholder has ten
target shares, each with a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $50. The shareholder
exchanges his target stock for $200 in cash and five shares of acquiring stock, each
worth $60. The shareholder then allocates the $200 received to four of his target shares
surrendered and the five acquiring shares received to his other six target shares
surrendered. If the $200 in cash did not have the effect of a dividend, under § 302(b)(1)
the shareholder would be able to treat the stock-for-cash exchange like a sale and
recognize a $200 loss on the four target shares exchanged solely for cash. See I.R.C.
§ 302(a)–(b). Under § 354, the shareholder would also be able to defer his $300 loss on
the other six target shares exchanged solely for stock by taking an exchanged basis in the
new acquiring shares. See id. § 354(a). The shareholder’s five new acquiring shares
would have a total basis of $600—the same as the total basis in his six target shares
surrendered in exchange for them—while their fair market value would be $300. See id.
§ 358(a). The shareholder could then recognize a $300 loss upon subsequent sale of
these five acquiring shares. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G). Although the
shareholder would be unable to currently recognize his entire $500 loss, by splitting up
the transaction as permitted under the new proposed 2009 regulations the shareholder
would still be able to recognize $200 of the loss that could not have been recognized had
§ 356 applied. See I.R.C. § 356; Proposed 2009 Regulations, supra note 34, at 3512.
Moreover, the shareholder would also preserve deferral of the other $300 loss through
the receipt of an exchange basis in his new acquiring shares rather than risk the
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Although this approach to loss treatment may have some superficial
appeal, § 356 avoidance permitted under the proposed 2009 regulations
can lead to unintended tax consequences if the shareholder holds some
target stock with a fair market value exceeding its tax basis and some
with fair market value below basis. 78 In such a circumstance, the
shareholder can structure the exchange such that the shareholder recognizes
loss on his built-in loss shares and defers gain on his built-in gain
shares.79 This would clearly provide a “best of both worlds” result for the
shareholder.80 In effect, the shareholder would be able not only to shelter
his gains but also to currently recognize losses the shareholder should
not yet be entitled to.81 Although this result may initially appear favorable
from the shareholder’s perspective, it would also defer tax revenues
collected by the Service.82 Deferral of tax revenues would hinder federal
government efforts to reduce tax rates and pay down the federal budget
deficit, thereby triggering a long-run detriment to the shareholders and the
American public that may outweigh the short-run benefits created by the
loophole.83
uncertainty as to loss treatment that would result if § 356 were to apply. See I.R.C.
§ 358(a); Final 2006 Regulations, supra note 45, at 4265.
78. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F).
79. See id.
80. See id. For example, assume a shareholder holds seven target shares, each
with a basis of $30 and fair market value of $60—his built-in gain shares—and four
target shares, each with a basis of $50 and fair market value of $20—his built-in loss
shares. The shareholder exchanges all of his target shares for acquiring shares worth
$420 plus $80 in cash. The shareholder then allocates all of the acquiring shares
received to his target gain shares surrendered and allocates all of the cash received to his
target loss shares surrendered, as permitted under the proposed 2009 regulations. See
Proposed 2009 Regulations, supra note 34, at 3512. The target gain shares exchanged
solely for acquiring shares will be analyzed under § 354, and no gain will be currently
recognized. See I.R.C. § 354(a). A gain of $210 will be deferred as a basis adjustment
to the acquiring shares received. See id. § 358(a). The target loss shares exchanged
solely for cash will be analyzed under § 302, which allows for current recognition of loss
assuming that the cash received does not have the effect of a dividend. See id. § 302(a)–
(b). Thus, a loss of $120 will be immediately recognized upon the exchange. See id.
Even though the overall transaction results in a realized gain of $90, the shareholder is
able to structure the transaction so as to facilitate an immediate $120 loss recognition but
no corresponding gain recognition. See id. §§ 302(a)–(b), 354(a).
81. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F).
82. See Kaye, supra note 72, at 587 (citing JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40219, TAX GAP, TAX ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX COMPLIANCE PROPOSALS IN THE
111TH CONGRESS 5 (2009); JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40004, MAJOR
TAX ISSUES IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 10 (2008)).
83. See id.; Rachelle Y. Holmes, Deconstructing the Rules of Corporate Tax, 25
AKRON TAX J. 1, 51 (2010).
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. Legislative History Supports Loss Deferral
The proposed 2009 regulations run contrary to congressional intent,
which is to apply § 356 in all corporate reorganizations where a
shareholder receives both stock and boot in order to defer losses.84
A straightforward interpretation of § 356 would require a shareholder to
determine the section’s applicability to a transaction as a whole.85 Under
this interpretation, the shareholder would not recognize any loss any time
target stock was exchanged for acquiring stock in a reorganization even if
boot was involved in the exchange.86 Nowhere does the language of
the section suggest that a shareholder may simply avoid § 356 by
strategically allocating specific consideration received to specific shares
of stock surrendered and then determining § 356 applicability on a
share-by-share basis, as permitted by the proposed 2009 regulations.87
This straightforward interpretation is also consistent with legislative
history.88 In early federal income tax cases dealing with corporate
reorganizations, the Supreme Court held that even minor changes in the
form of a corporation resulted in realized gain to the shareholders.89
Unless the rules were changed such that shareholders would not have to
recognize certain gains, shareholders could face substantial taxation on
gains in every reorganization that occurred, and corporations would
therefore be less likely to engage in such reorganizations even if they
were beneficial to business and commerce. 90 Realizing the need for
reorganizations to encourage and promote successful businesses, Congress
acted quickly to eliminate this deterrent by enacting one of the earliest
nonrecognition Code sections: § 202.91 It provided that a shareholder

84. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. G(2) (stating that the intent of § 356 was that
“so long as the surrendering shareholder receives some nonrecognition property in the
overall transaction, Section 356 should be interpreted as requiring deferral of losses
realized on the surrender of target shares in connection with a reorganization”).
85. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(C); I.R.C. § 356 (2006).
86. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G); I.R.C. § 356.
87. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G); I.R.C. § 356.
88. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G).
89. See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 413
(7th ed. 2008). In Marr v. United States, for example, the Court held that even changing
the state of incorporation from New Jersey to Delaware triggered realized gain. 268 U.S.
536, 541–42 (1925).
90. See LIND ET AL., supra note 89, at 413.
91. See id. Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 stated:
When in connection with [a] reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a
corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him new
stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss
shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock or securities
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could recognize neither gain nor loss upon the exchange of stock for
stock in a reorganization.92 In enacting this nonrecognition section,
Congress reasoned that taxes should not hinder transactions that were
mere readjustments of a continuing interest 93 in property, although
represented in a different corporate form.94 Similar to the rationale behind
nonrecognition in like-kind exchanges under § 1031—that a taxpayer
should not be taxed on an unliquidated gain—Congress felt that gain on
property surrendered in a corporate reorganization should not be taxed
because it was “substantially a continuation of the old investment still
unliquidated.”95
If the shareholder terminated a portion of his or her investment in
a corporation, however, recognition of gain on that portion would be
proper.96 Thus, the Revenue Act of 1921 required shareholders to recognize
realized gain, if any, to the extent of the boot received under § 202(e).97
received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property
exchanged.
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919).
92. Revenue Act of 1918 § 202(b).
93. See Kenneth A. Jewell, Acquisitive Reorganizations and Continuity of Interest:
The Case Against Preferred Stock, 9 B.U. J. TAX L. 189, 194 (1991). For type “B” and
“C” reorganizations, § 368 ensures continuity of interest by requiring that voting stock of
the acquiring corporation comprise a certain percentage of the total consideration. Id.
However, in type “A” reorganizations, § 368 does not address the composition of the
consideration. Id. However, according to Revenue Procedure 77-37, the “continuity of
interest” requirement is satisfied if
there is a continuing interest through stock ownership in the acquiring or
transferee corporation (or a corporation in “control” thereof within the
meaning of section 368(c) of the Code) on the part of the former shareholders
of the acquired or transferor corporation which is equal in value, as of the
effective date of the reorganization, to at least 50 percent of the value of all of
the formerly outstanding stock of the acquired or transferor corporation as of
the same date. . . . Sales, redemptions, and other dispositions of stock
occurring prior or subsequent to the exchange which are part of the plan of
reorganization will be considered in determining whether there is a 50 percent
continuing interest through stock ownership as of the effective date of the
reorganization.
Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568; see also McDonald’s Rests. of Ill., Inc. v. Comm’r,
688 F.2d 520, 527–28 (7th Cir. 1982).
94. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (as amended in 2008).
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1957); I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2006) (“No gain or
loss shall be recognized on the exchange of property held for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment if such property is exchanged solely for property of like kind
which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.”).
96. See Revenue Act of 1918 § 202(b).
97. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(e), 42 Stat. 227, 230–31 (providing
that when, in a reorganization, property is exchanged for property and boot, the fair
market value of the boot “shall be applied against and reduce the basis, provided in this
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Yet, this Act did not mention what would happen to a loss in such an
exchange where boot was involved.98 Finally, the Revenue Act of 1928
directly addressed treatment of the shareholder’s loss under § 112(e).99
It stated that a shareholder would not recognize a loss in the exchange.100
The Revenue Act of 1928 also clarified what Congress had been trying
to accomplish since its earlier 1918 version of § 202—that the
nonrecognition of gain or loss rule in corporate formation changes meant
deferral rather than permanent exclusion of the gain or loss.101 Congress
expressed its intent by providing carryover and substituted basis rules in
its effort to preserve unrecognized gain or loss.102 In this way, shareholders
would still recognize gain or loss, but not until they liquidated their
investment in the corporation.103 This Act suggests that Congress not
only intended § 356 to be mandatory rather than optional but also intended
shareholders to defer their losses through a carryover or substituted-basis
mechanism rather than permanently exclude or currently recognize their
losses as the proposed 2009 regulations would permit.104
If Congress intended loss nonrecognition to be optional, it could have
expressly provided elective language in the Code.105 Instead, Congress
reaffirmed its intent in the 1923 legislative history by providing an
example in which the boot was looked at together with the stock in a
reorganization in order to trigger nonrecognition treatment.106 The
section, of the property exchanged, and if in excess of such basis, . . . shall be taxable to
the extent of the excess”).
98. See id.
99. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(e), 45 Stat. 791, 817.
100. See id. (stating that when boot is involved in an otherwise tax-free
reorganization, “no loss from the exchange shall be recognized”).
101. See LIND ET AL., supra note 89, at 414.
102. See Revenue Act of 1928 § 113(a)(6)–(9).
103. See LIND ET AL., supra note 89, at 413–14.
104. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G).
105. Id. Section 338(h)(10) provides an example of a Code section where Congress
clearly expressed its intent that recognition of gain or loss be elective. I.R.C.
§ 338(h)(10) (2006). This section states that when a corporation purchases a stock
interest in a target corporation “an election may be made” under which, if certain
elements are met, no gain or loss will be recognized on stock sold or exchanged in the
transaction by members of the selling consolidated group. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 67-1432, at 3 (1923). The example Congress gave provided
that
the taxable gain shall not exceed the amount of “boot” received in exchange.
Thus, if a taxpayer exchanges stock which cost him $100 for stock in a new
corporation, together with $100 in “boot,” the stock of the new corporation
received in exchange would be valued, and if it is found that it is worth $100
the total amount received by the taxpayer has been $200, which is $100 in
excess of the cost of the old, and he would therefore, under the proposed law,
pay a tax on a gain of $100. If, however, the amount of the “boot” received is
only $95 and the stock in the new corporation is worth $105, he has made the
same gain of $100, but he would be taxed only on $95, namely, the amount of
the “boot” received in exchange. The reason for this is that the profit, so far as
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manner in which Congress examined the boot together with the stock in
this example shows that Congress intended the transaction to be looked
at as a whole rather than as a set of separate share-by-share transactions.107
The rationale behind Congress’s treatment of boot in the example was
that it did not intend for shareholders to be forced to recognize any
unrealized gain.108 Logistically, Congress must have similarly intended
nonrecognition treatment for unrealized losses as the counterpart to
nonrecognition for unrealized gains.109 Congress’s intended result, however,
would be meaningless if shareholders could simply avoid it altogether by
splitting their transaction up into several share-by-share subtransactions
and applying the tax treatment of a more favorable Code provision to
each of these subtransactions.110 Strategic use of § 302 and § 354 could
enable shareholders to receive basis recovery on gain shares and loss
recognition on loss shares even though they continue to hold an investment
in the acquiring corporation.111
B. Congress Intended Similar Nonrecognition Sections To Prevent
Taxpayers from Recognizing Gains or Losses that
Lack Economic Reality
Case law interpreting congressional intent behind similar Code sections
can also be helpful in understanding the congressional intent underpinning
§ 356.112 Similar to § 356, § 1031 prevents a taxpayer from recognizing
gain or loss when property held for productive use in a business or
it is contained in the new stock received, has not yet been realized, and
therefore should not be taxed until the new stock is sold or in some way
disposed of so that the profit will be actually realized.
Id. (emphasis added).
107. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G).
108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1957).
109. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(C). Subsections (a) and (c) of § 356 use exactly
the same language and work together to provide the rules for both gains and losses on a
§ 356 exchange, further suggesting that unrealized gains and losses under § 356 should
be treated in similar manners. See id.
110. See id. pt. X(G).
111. See id.
112. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008). The Court recognizes that Congress can
“legislate away” the Court’s interpretation of a statute if Congress disagrees with the
Court’s interpretation. See id. To avoid this result, the Court frequently refers to
legislative history and congressional intent in interpreting statutes. See Wirtz v. Bottle
Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968) (“[P]roper construction frequently requires
consideration of [a statute’s] wording against the background of its legislative history
and in the light of the general objectives Congress sought to achieve.”).
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investment is exchanged solely for property of like kind that is also held
for investment or productive use in a trade or business.113 If the taxpayer
receives boot, gain but not loss will be recognized to the extent of the
boot because boot is not considered like-kind property.114 In Starker
v. United States, the plaintiff and his family agreed to convey land to a
corporation in exchange for a deed to suitable real property within five
years or payment of any outstanding cash balance.115 The plaintiff and
his family did not report any gain in the transaction, claiming the
transaction was entitled to nonrecognition treatment under § 1031.116
The court found that under § 1031, the exchange constituted a like-kind
nonrecognition exchange because the contractual right to assume
ownership of property should not be treated any differently from
ownership of the property itself.117 The court emphasized that the
taxpayer still had an interest in property after the exchange and that the
purpose of § 1031 was to prevent the inequity that would result if a
taxpayer were required to pay taxes on such an exchange even when the
taxpayer “[did] not ‘cash in’ or ‘close out’ his or her investment.”118
Another nonrecognition Code provision, § 351, is also similar to § 356
in that it prevents taxpayers from recognizing gain or loss when they
give property to a corporation in exchange for stock in the corporation
and they are in control of the corporation immediately after the
exchange.119 If boot is received, gain but not loss will be recognized to
the extent of the boot received because boot is not considered stock.120
In E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, the plaintiff granted
its subsidiary a nonexclusive license in connection with its foreign

113. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2006).
114. Id. § 1031(b) (providing that if boot is received, “gain, if any, to the recipient
shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the
fair market value of such other property”); id. § 1031(c) (providing that if boot is
received “no loss from the exchange shall be recognized”).
115. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1979).
116. Id. at 1343.
117. Id. at 1355.
118. Id.
119. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006). Section 351(a) states the general rule that “[n]o gain or
loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons
solely in exchange for stock in such corporation and immediately after the exchange
such person or persons are in control (as defined in section 368(c)) of the corporation.”
Id.; see also id. § 368(c) (defining the term control to mean “the ownership of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of the corporation”).
120. See id. § 351(b) (providing that if property other than stock is received, then
“(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but not in excess of—(A) the
amount of money received, plus (B) the fair market value of such other property
received; and (2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized”).
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patents on herbicides in exchange for stock in the subsidiary.121 The
court found that the plaintiff had a continuous interest in, as well as
continuous control over, the subsidiary, and that the transfer of the
license, over which the plaintiff also had control, to the controlled
subsidiary was not a taxable event pursuant to § 351.122 By allowing the
plaintiff to defer tax on the transaction, the court noted that in enacting
§ 351, Congress aimed to “disregard dispositions which are merely formal
and do not have economic or commercial reality.”123
Yet another provision of the Code, § 354, the foundation upon which
§ 356 was built, consistently prevents a taxpayer from recognizing gain
or loss when the taxpayer exchanges stock or securities in a corporation
solely for stock or securities in another corporation that is a party to the
reorganization.124 In Commissioner v. Gilmore’s Estate, respondent
shareholders in a New Jersey holding company were involved in a
merger.125 Pursuant to the terms of the merger, the respondents surrendered
their holding company stock to the surviving corporation and received its
shares in return, after which the holding company stock was cancelled.126
On appeal, the court held that the transaction was a statutory merger127
and therefore that the respondents’ gain on the exchange of their stock in
the holding company for stock in the surviving company was a nontaxable

121. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1212 (Ct. Cl.
1973).
122. Id. at 1217–19.
123. Id. at 1217. Similarly, in Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, an oil company
transferred an installment contract to the petitioner corporation in exchange for capital
stocks and bonds that the oil company distributed to its shareholders before dissolving.
109 F.2d 479, 483–84 (1st Cir. 1940). The court found that under § 112(b)(5) of the
Revenue Act of 1928—now § 351—the exchange constituted a nonrecognition
transaction because the oil company had not received any cash benefit on the exchange
of the installment contract but merely received stock that the oil company could choose
to hold onto for investment. Id. at 490. In finding that nonrecognition of the gain was
appropriate in this circumstance, the court noted that Congress’s intent behind
§ 112(b)(5) was to save taxpayers from recognizing gains or losses that resulted from
mere changes in the form of ownership and lacked economic reality. Id. at 488.
124. I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (2006).
125. Comm’r v. Gilmore’s Estate, 130 F.2d 791, 792 (3d Cir. 1942).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 794. The court found that the transaction constituted a reorganization
under section 112(g)(1)(A) of the Revenue Act of 1934. See id. at 794, 797.
A reorganization under section 112(g)(1)(A) of the Revenue Act of 1934 was defined as
a “statutory merger or consolidation.” Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(1)(A), 48
Stat. 680, 705. This is the same language now used to define an “A” reorganization
under § 368(a)(1)(A) of the current Code. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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reorganization.128 The court noted that the purpose of nonrecognition of
gain or loss in a reorganization transaction was to free shareholders from
the burden of an income tax on “purely ‘paper profits or losses’ wherein
there [was] no realization of gain or loss in the business sense but merely
the recasting of the same interests in a different form, the tax being
postponed to a future date when a more tangible gain or loss is realized.”129
Another decision, United Gas Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, further
supports the view that Congress intended § 354 to require not only
deferral of gains but also deferral of losses not presently suffered rather
than recognition of them immediately.130 In United Gas Improvement
Co., the petitioner owned most of the stock of a company, which filed
for a bankruptcy reorganization plan.131 As part of the plan, the petitioner
paid off the debts of the company in exchange for receipt of all of the
capital stock of the reorganized company.132 The petitioner deducted
losses on its investment in the old company’s stock and on the cancellation
of the company’s indebtedness.133 The court determined that reorganization
of the old company was part of one integrated transaction in which the
petitioner did not cash out its equity interest in the old company but
instead preserved its interest in the stock of the reorganized company.134
Therefore, the transaction was considered a nontaxable reorganization,
and the petitioner could not deduct the losses.135 In rejecting the deduction,
the court noted that “‘the purpose of the statutory nonrecognition of gain
or loss from reorganization transactions’ . . . was in part ‘to prevent
losses [from] being established by bondholders, as well as stockholders,
who ha[d] received the new securities without substantially changing
their original investment.’”136
The court’s understanding of Congress’s intent behind nonrecognition
of gain or loss in § 1031 and § 351 is the same rationale underlying
nonrecognition pursuant to § 354—that shareholders should be free from
128.
129.

Gilmore’s Estate, 130 F.2d at 795–97.
Id. at 794 (citing J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938–1861, at 332–40, 795–96 (1938)).
130. See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Comm’r, 142 F.2d 216, 218–19 (3d Cir.
1944).
131. See id. at 216–17.
132. Id. at 217.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 217–18.
135. See id. at 218–19. The court found that the transaction constituted a
reorganization under section 112(g)(1)(D) of the Revenue Act of 1936. Id. at 218.
A reorganization under section 112(g)(1)(D) of the Revenue Act of 1936 was defined as
a “recapitalization.” Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 112(g)(1)(D), 49 Stat. 1648, 1681.
This is the same term now used to define an “E” reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(E) of
the current Code. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E) (2006).
136. United Gas Improvement Co., 142 F.2d at 218–19 (quoting Comm’r
v. Neustadt’s Trust, 131 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir. 1942)).
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current taxation of purely paper profits or losses stemming from the
mere recasting of their same interests in a different form.137 Because
§§ 1031, 351, and 354 are similar to § 356, both in terms of context of
application and the manner in which they operate, the court’s interpretation
of congressional intent regarding these sections complements the
legislative history of § 356 in strongly suggesting that Congress intended
to employ § 356 as yet another tool to ensure that taxpayers would not
recognize gain or loss that lacked economic reality.138
C. Similar Nonrecognition Sections Reject Transaction-Splitting as a
Means To Achieve Immediate Recognition
Sections 1031 and 351 both contain provisions that deal with boot.139
Section 354 applies only to exchanges of stock solely for stock and thus
leaves a gap concerning transactions involving boot.140 Consequently,
when a § 354 transaction involves boot, it triggers § 356.141 It follows
then that because § 356 fills the boot gap for § 354 and § 354 treats
exchanges identically to §§ 1031 and 351, § 356 should treat boot in a
manner consistent with §§ 1031’s and 351’s treatment of boot.142
In Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, the taxpayer transferred a
building it owned and used in its manufacturing business to a third party
in exchange for a ninety-five-year lease on the same property and
$150,000.143 The court found that the transaction was a like-kind
exchange under § 112(b) and § 112(e)—now § 1031—because the petitioner
still ended up with an interest in the same property after the exchange.144
137. See supra notes 118, 123, 129, 136 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Part IV.A.
139. See I.R.C. §§ 1031(b), 351(b) (2006).
140. See id. § 354(a)(1).
141. See id. § 356.
142. See supra Part IV.B.
143. Century Elec. Co v. Comm’r, 192 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir. 1951). The petitioner
claimed a deductible loss on the property exchanged for the lease and the $150,000, arguing
that the transaction was a sale rather than an exchange of like property. Id.
144. Id. at 159–60. The only change in the exchange was that the petitioner’s
interest in the property was transformed from a fee to a lease. Id. Section 112(b)(1) of
the Revenue Act of 1928 provided:
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade
or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property
held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates
of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness
or interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for
productive use in trade or business or for investment.
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Consequently, the petitioner could not take an immediate loss in the
transaction.145 The court refused to let the $150,000 involved in the
transaction turn the like-kind exchange into a sale that would permit the
immediate recognition of a loss because the transaction could “not be
separated into its component parts for tax purposes.”146 Instead, the
court found that in determining whether to treat the transaction as a sale
or a like-kind exchange, the “[t]ax consequences must depend on what
actually was intended and accomplished rather than on the separate steps
taken to reach the desired end.”147 In determining the intent, the court
analyzed the exchange as a whole so that the taxpayer could not avoid
nonrecognition treatment simply by including boot.148
Labrot v. Burnet similarly demonstrates that a § 351 transaction involving
the exchange of property for both stock and cash should be analyzed as a
whole so as to require nonrecognition treatment for a loss.149 In Labrot,
a partnership, in which the petitioners were partners, transferred cash and
two properties to a newly formed corporation in exchange for virtually all
of the stock in the corporation as well as $80,000.150 The petitioners
believed that the properties were transferred to the corporation solely in
exchange for the $80,000, while the cash was transferred to the corporation
separately in exchange for the corporation’s stock.151 In treating the
transfer of the property as a sale, the petitioners deducted the difference
between the cost of the two properties and the $80,000 as a loss on their
tax returns.152 The court, however, found the transaction as a whole was
really a § 202(c)—a predecessor to § 351—nonrecognition transaction,
stating that “the transaction [was] essentially one of the kind in which
Congress did not intend for the purposes of taxation to recognize either
gain or loss, and that we should be governed by its substance and not its

Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(b)(1), 45 Stat. 791, 816. Section 112(e) provided:
If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (b)(1) to (5),
inclusive, of this section if it were not for the fact that the property received in
exchange consists not only of property permitted by such paragraph to be
received without the recognition of gain or loss, but also of other property or
money, then no loss from the exchange shall be recognized.
Id. § 112(e).
145. Century Elec. Co., 192 F.2d at 159.
146. Id.
147. Id. The court found that the “end” of the transaction between the petitioner
and the college was “that intended by the petitioner at its beginning, namely, the transfer
of the fee in the foundry property for the 95-year lease on the same property and
$150,000.” Id.
148. Id.
149. See Labrot v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 413, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
150. Id. at 413.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 414–15.
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form.”153 The court’s main concern in allowing the petitioners to split
their transaction into two separate exchanges was that if the petitioners
were permitted to deduct a portion of their investment losses as a result
of the split, then future taxpayers could exploit this type of arrangement
by selling their investments to themselves for merely nominal consideration
so as to deduct even greater losses.154 In refusing to recognize the
transaction as two separate exchanges, the court held that the petitioner
could not recognize a loss on the property surrendered to the corporation.155
In both Century Electric and Labrot, the court refused to split otherwise
nonrecognition transactions into separate taxable and nontaxable
transactions where boot was involved.156 If this were not the case,
application of either § 1031 or § 351 would be merely optional,
encouraging shareholders to structure their transactions so as to recognize
losses on property exchanged solely for boot while deferring gain on
property exchanged solely for like-kind property or stock.157 Following
the court’s interpretation of § 1031 and § 351, a shareholder’s exchange
of target stock for both acquiring stock and cash in a reorganization
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 202(c)(3) of the Revenue Act
of 1921 stated:
(c) For the purposes of this title, on an exchange of property, real, personal, or
mixed, for any other such property, no gain or loss shall be recognized unless
the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value; but
even if the property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value,
no gain or loss shall be recognized—
....
(3) When (A) a person transfers any property, real, personal or mixed, to a
corporation, and immediately after the transfer is in control of such
corporation, or (B) two or more persons transfer any such property to a
corporation, and immediately after the transfer are in control of such
corporation, and the amounts of stock, securities, or both, received by
such persons are in substantially the same proportion as their interests in
the property before such transfer. For the purposes of this paragraph, a
person is, or two or more persons are, “in control” of a corporation when
owning at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per
centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation.
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 227, 230.
154. Labrot, 57 F.2d at 414.
155. See id. The court also noted that treating the petitioners’ transfer of the
property as a separate sale was unreasonable because then the sale would have been
virtually a sale of the property by the petitioners to themselves for about half the price.
Id. Were the petitioners to sell the property to someone else, it would not have been at
such a low price. Id.
156. See supra Part IV.C and notes 143–55.
157. See supra Part IV.C and notes 143–55.
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transaction should be viewed as a single integrated transaction for the
purpose of determining the applicability of § 356 as well.158 Viewed as
such, even if a shareholder chooses to allocate solely cash to some of the
shareholder’s target stock, § 356 will still apply to that portion of the
transaction because, in its entirety, the transaction consists of target stock
exchanged for both acquiring stock and cash.159
D. Commissioner v. Clark Supports Analyzing
Transactions as a Whole
Case law interpreting §§ 1031 and 351 supports the conclusion that
Congress intended that whenever a shareholder exchanges stock for both
stock and cash in a reorganization, § 356 should apply to the transaction
as a whole and losses should therefore be deferred.160 Case law interpreting
§ 356 also supports this conclusion.161 In Commissioner v. Clark, the
taxpayer was the sole owner of a target company.162 The taxpayer
exchanged his target shares for 300,000 acquiring shares and cash boot
158. See supra Part IV.C.
159. See I.R.C. § 356 (2006).
160. See supra Part IV.C.
161. See Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 737 (1989). The Service also analyzed
reorganization transactions as a whole to determine the effect of § 356 in Revenue
Ruling 74-515. See Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118. In Revenue Ruling 74-515, a
target company merged into an acquiring company. See id. The target shareholders
exchanged target common stock for acquiring common stock and exchanged target
preferred stock for cash. See id. The common-for-common exchanges and preferredfor-cash exchanges were “separate exchanges that were separately bargained for.” Id.
Thus, under § 354, shareholders who held only target common stock did not recognize
gain or loss on its surrender for acquiring stock. Id.; I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (2006). Under
§ 302(a), shareholders who held only target preferred stock recognized gain or loss on
the surrender of target stock for cash that did not have the effect of a dividend. Rev. Rul.
74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; I.R.C. § 302(a)–(b) (2006). Yet, a shareholder who held both
common and preferred stock in target was considered to have made one exchange under
§ 356 as opposed to two separate exchanges—an exchange of common-for-common
stock under § 354 and an exchange of preferred-for-cash under § 302. Rev. Rul. 74-515,
1974-2 C.B. 118. The exchange was treated as an exchange under § 356 because,
overall, the shareholder received both stock and cash from acquiring in exchange for his
stock in target. Id.; I.R.C. § 356 (2006). As a result, the shareholder could not recognize
any gain or loss on the common-for-common stock exchange, but on the preferred-forcash exchange, the shareholder would recognize the full gain, but no loss. Rev. Rul. 74515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; I.R.C. § 356.
Revenue Ruling 74-515’s interpretation of the common-for-common and preferredfor-cash transactions as part of one larger transaction for shareholders who surrendered
both common and preferred stock, even if arguably two separate transactions could have
taken place, appears to be a somewhat strained attempt to invoke § 356. See Schler,
supra note 3, pt. X(A). By viewing two conceivably separate exchanges as only one
overarching transaction in order to apply § 356, the Service demonstrated its firm belief
that a proper implementation of congressional intent was to apply § 356 in such a
manner that ensured that a shareholder could not avoid § 356 by transaction-splitting.
See id.
162. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 731.
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of $3.25 million.163 Section 356 applied to the exchange because the
target shareholder received both stock and cash in exchange for his
target shares.164 The issue was not whether the boot was taxable under
§ 356 but rather whether the boot had the effect of a dividend distribution
and would therefore be taxed as a dividend rather than as a capital
gain.165 The Court found that the language and history of § 356, as well
as the economic substance of the transaction, revealed that the transaction
should be analyzed as a whole in order to determine how to treat the
boot.166 The Court therefore took a postreorganization approach167 to
determine whether the taxpayer experienced a meaningful reduction in
his potential ownership interest so as to receive capital gains treatment
under § 302(a).168 Under this postreorganization approach, the Court
held that the taxpayer experienced a meaningful reduction in his potential
ownership interest by accepting the cash payment and therefore this cash
payment would not be taxed as a dividend.169
163. Id.
164. Id. at 732.
165. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (discussing gain on exchanges and
treatment as dividends).
166. Clark, 489 U.S. at 737.
167. Id. at 736–37. In a postreorganization approach, a pure stock-for-stock
exchange is imagined. Id. at 733. This is followed by an immediate postreorganization
redemption of a portion of the taxpayer’s new acquiring shares in exchange for cash
equal to the amount of the boot. Id. The percent interest the taxpayer holds in the
acquiring corporation immediately after the imaginary pure stock-for-stock exchange is
then compared with the percent interest the taxpayer holds in the acquiring corporation
after the postreorganization redemption. See id. If there is a substantial reduction in the
taxpayer’s interest in the acquiring corporation under § 302(b), then the boot qualifies for
capital gains treatment under § 302(a). Id.; Rev. Rul. 93-61, 1993-2 C.B. 118. This is in
contrast to a prereorganization approach, which was the approach used in Shimberg
v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1978).
Under the Shimberg
prereorganization approach, the boot is treated as if it were payment in a
prereorganization redemption by the target corporation for the taxpayer’s target stock.
Id. The percent interest the taxpayer held in the target corporation prior to the
hypothetical redemption is then compared with the taxpayer’s interest in the target
corporation after the hypothetical redemption. Id. If there is a substantial reduction in
the taxpayer’s interest in the target corporation under § 302(b), then the boot qualifies for
capital gains treatment. Clark, 489 U.S. at 733; Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
168. Clark, 489 U.S. at 737.
169. Id. at 740. The Court found that the shareholder experienced a substantial
reduction of interest pursuant to § 302(b)(2) and therefore was entitled to capital gains
treatment under § 302(a). Id. The Court also noted that the taxpayer might have been
able to obtain capital gains treatment under § 302(b)(1), which allows for capital gains
treatment if the boot is “not essentially equivalent to a dividend.” Id. at 740 n.8 (quoting
I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (2006)). This possibility was not explored further, however, because
the taxpayer already met the requirements of § 302(b)(2). Id.
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In relation to the proposed 2009 regulations, Clark is important not
because the boot qualified for capital gains rather than dividend
treatment but because the Court found that § 356 transactions should be
analyzed as a whole.170 The Court noted that in determining dividend
equivalency, “[s]ection 356(a)(2) asks whether ‘an exchange is described in
paragraph (1)’ that ‘has the effect of the distribution of a dividend.’”171
Thus, the question was not whether the boot itself had the effect of a
dividend but rather whether the entire “exchange” had the effect of a
dividend.172 Paragraph (1) also refers to “the exchange,” stating that § 356
applies if § 354 or § 355 would apply but for the fact that “the property
received in the exchange consists not only of property permitted by
section 354 or 355 to be received without the recognition of gain but
also of other property or money.”173 This wording of the statute further
supports the position that an exchange of target stock for both acquiring
stock and boot should be analyzed as one integrated transaction.174
Moreover, under § 356, boot is only taxable up to the gain realized in the
overall reorganization transaction.175 This restriction indicates, as the
Court noted, that boot should, in fact, be considered an integral part of
the whole reorganization and that Congress did not want taxpayers to be
able to separate the boot from the other consideration.176 Finally, the
Court found that reading § 356 to require that boot and stock be considered
part of one overall transaction was reinforced by the “step transaction”
doctrine.177 This doctrine provides that “interrelated yet formally distinct
steps in an integrated transaction may not be considered independently
of the overall transaction.”178
170. Clark, 489 U.S. at 737.
171. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (2006)).
172. See id.
173. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting I.R.C. § 356 (2006)).
174. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 737.
175. See id.; I.R.C. § 356.
176. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 737–38. If the boot in the reorganization has the effect
of a dividend, then under § 356(a)(2), the boot is taxed as a dividend to the lesser of the
taxpayer’s ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of “the corporation” or
the gain realized. See Jack Levin, Melvin S. Adess & Jere D. McGaffey, Boot Distributions
in Corporate Reorganizations—Determination of Dividend Equivalency, 30 TAX LAW.
287, 303 (1976). Whether the phrase the corporation refers to the acquired or the
acquiring corporation is unclear, but to remain consistent with viewing the transaction as
a whole it would appear that the best interpretation of the corporation would be to look
to both corporations. See id.
177. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 738.
178. See id. The step transaction doctrine’s purpose is to ensure that transactions
are taxed according to their substance and not their form. See id. If a court finds that
applying the step transaction doctrine is appropriate it can either (1) disregard
transactions or steps in a transaction that it believes are unnecessary, or (2) change the
order of such transactions or steps. See True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174–76
(10th Cir. 1999). In most cases, the former action is taken, and several transactions or
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Overall, in determining whether boot under § 356 had the effect of a
dividend, the Court came to the conclusion that a postreorganization
approach was preferable to a prereorganization because a postreorganization
approach at least acknowledged that a reorganization had taken place.179
This was more in keeping with analyzing the transaction as a whole.180
Whereas the Court analyzed the reorganization transaction as a whole
for the purpose of determining whether the boot should be treated as a
dividend, consistency would dictate that reorganization transactions should
also be analyzed as a whole for the purpose of determining how losses
should be treated when boot is involved.181
V. THE PROPOSED 2009 REGULATIONS ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH PUBLIC POLICY
If the proposed 2009 regulations become final regulations, many
taxpayers will be able to obtain immediate recognition, rather than
deferral, of their losses upon the surrender of their loss shares in a
reorganization.182 For many taxpayers, the ability to strategically structure a
reorganization transaction so as to recognize current losses but defer
gains on their target shares presents a favorable opportunity that taxpayers
steps are integrated into a single transaction. See id. at 1175. Courts have developed
three tests for determining when the step transaction doctrine should operate to collapse
the individual steps of a complex transaction into a single integrated transaction for tax
purposes: (1) binding transaction, (2) end result, and (3) mutual interdependence. See id.
at 1174–75. Under the binding commitment test, separate steps will be collapsed into a
single transaction only if, at the time the first step takes place, the taxpayer was under a
commitment to complete the remaining steps. See Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96
(1968). Under the end result test, if a court finds that a series of closely related steps or
events is merely the means to achieve a particular end result, it treats the steps as a single
transaction. See Kornfeld v. Comm’r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998). Finally,
under the mutual interdependence test, separate steps will be collapsed if, under a
reasonable interpretation of the objectively stated facts, the steps are interdependent of
one another. See Redding v. Comm’r, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980).
179. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 741. The prereorganization approach, on the other
hand, ignores the reorganization by comparing only the taxpayer’s interest in the target
corporation at two points in time prior to the reorganization to determine if the taxpayer
experiences a substantial reduction of interest in the corporation to qualify for capital
gains treatment. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
180. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 741; supra note 161 and accompanying text.
181. See Levin et al., supra note 176, at 303 (considering the importance of
harmonizing the analysis of “how much boot is taxable as a dividend with the test of
whether boot is taxable as a dividend” under an analysis of the reorganization as a
whole).
182. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F).
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would enthusiastically embrace and exploit.183 In light of the current
federal budget deficit, however, this apparent windfall for taxpayers in
the short run will do more harm than good in the long run.184 Currently,
high United States corporate tax rates motivate corporate taxpayers to
take aggressive self-help measures, including the use of loopholes, to
reduce their corporate tax liabilities.185 In fiscal year 2001, for example,
the Service estimated “that abusive corporate tax shelters contributed
$10 to $15 billion of the $30 billion in unreported . . . corporate income
taxes.”186 Similarly, individual shareholders also seek to take advantage
of any opportunity they may have to reduce their tax liability.187 In
fiscal year 2001, the Service estimated that overall it failed to collect
$345 billion in taxes owed for that year.188 The annual failure to collect
such substantial tax revenue sums owed by corporations and individuals
has made a significant impact upon the current federal budget deficit and
will continue to influence the projected federal budget deficit if something
does not change.189
In reaction to the problem, the Obama administration proposed to
close loopholes that enable taxpayers to avoid current taxation by
183. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; Holmes, supra note 83, at 14
(noting that sophisticated taxpayers often create “convoluted structures” in an attempt to
“achieve tax-favorable results”).
184. See Kaye, supra note 72, at 587 (citing BICKLEY, supra note 82, at 5;
GRAVELLE, supra note 82, at 10).
185. See Holmes, supra note 83, at 19. United States corporate tax rates are the
second highest among the nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). See id. at 15.
186. Kaye, supra note 72, at 587 (quoting BICKLEY, supra note 82, at 5) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Even though the United States had the second highest
statutory rate among the OECD countries, the United States only generated about 2% of
its gross domestic product (GDP) from corporate tax revenues while the average OECD
country received about 3% of its GDP from corporate tax revenues. See Holmes, supra
note 83, at 19–20.
187. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 55, at 435.
188. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE
NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE TAX GAP 1 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY]. The $345 billion in uncollected taxes is considered a “tax gap.” See id.
A tax gap is the difference between the taxes that taxpayers should have paid on a timely
basis and the taxes that taxpayers actually paid. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 55, at 432.
189. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 55, at 432. Senator Max Baucus stated that tax
avoidance was unpatriotic and actually created the federal deficit, noting that “[w]hen
people and companies . . . don’t pay their taxes, the burden for paying this country’s
expenses falls even more heavily on Americans who do their duty every April 15.” Id.
(quoting Press Release, Sen. Max Baucus, Sen. Baucus Calls New Tax Gap Numbers
“Unacceptable,” Calls for Bolder IRS Action To Collect Taxes Owed (Feb. 14, 2006),
available at 2006 WLNR 2612436) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, the
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration estimated in 2008 that each
percentage point of noncompliance by the public costs the federal government
approximately $21 billion in lost revenue. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 188,
at 1.
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codifying the economic substance doctrine in its fiscal year 2010
revenue proposals.190 Although closing loopholes certainly diminishes a
taxpayer’s ability to lower tax liability via aggressive tax planning, this
lost benefit to the taxpayer will be outweighed by other benefits in the
long run.191 Increases in tax revenue to the Treasury Department
resulting from closed loopholes would enable the government to lower
its corporate and individual income tax rates, which are currently as high
as they are, in part, to offset noncompliance and failure to collect.192
Moreover, closing loopholes would enable the Treasury Department and
the Service to reduce their administrative and enforcement costs, thereby
making more funds available to other domestic programs.193 Fewer
loopholes and lower tax rates would also relieve pressure on taxpayers to
spend large sums on developing complicated tax planning strategies
specifically designed to lower their tax liabilities.194 Strategic tax planning
designed to exploit loopholes is often expensive and inefficient, and it
discriminates against taxpayers who lack the resources to afford it.195
Such inequity is reduced when loopholes are closed.196
Rather than close a loophole, the proposed 2009 regulations open up a
new loophole because they enable shareholders to obtain immediate loss
recognition in corporate reorganization transactions.197 In so doing, the
proposed 2009 regulations blatantly ignore the congressional intent that
shareholders defer their losses in such transactions pursuant to § 356.198
190. See Kaye, supra note 72, at 601. The economic substance doctrine is codified
in § 7701(o) and states:
(1) In the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is
relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only
if—
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal
income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax
effects) for entering into such transaction.
I.R.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. IV 2010). Under the recently codified economic substance
doctrine, the penalties and expected deterrent effect of penalties if their transactions do
not meet the requirements of the economic substance doctrine are estimated to raise $3.6
billion of federal revenue over a ten-year period between 2010 and 2019. See Shin-Li,
supra note 72, at 2033.
191. See Holmes, supra note 83, at 51.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 52.
194. See id. at 13.
195. See id. at 14–15.
196. See id.
197. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Part IV; I.R.C. § 356 (2006).
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Even though the proposed 2009 regulations would open up only one
loophole, any loophole has the potential to significantly reduce annual
tax revenues.199 As the example concerning the DIVX-SNIC merger
demonstrates, in light of the current economic downturn, more and more
shareholders who bought their stock prior to 2008 are likely to have
substantial losses when entering into corporate reorganizations.200 Such
shareholders will be eager to use this new loophole to obtain an immediate
tax benefit from their losses that they otherwise would not receive.201
Treasury Department efforts should aim to close such loopholes, not
open them, in order to raise revenue to reduce the federal deficit and
work toward the eventual reduction in overall tax rates for corporations
and individuals.202
VI. LOSS DEFERRAL IS A MORE APPROPRIATE ALTERNATIVE
A. Loss Deferral and Pro Rata Allocation
Legislative history, other nonrecognition provisions, and Clark all
show that Congress intended § 356 to apply to all reorganization
transactions where a shareholder exchanges target shares for both
acquiring shares and boot.203 By requiring § 356 application, Congress
ensures that shareholders holding a continuing equity interest in the
acquiring corporation do not obtain the unintended benefit of
recognizing an immediate loss when, in substance, it has not yet been
realized.204 Preventing current recognition leaves but two possible ways
199. See Kaye, supra note 72, at 587.
200. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha,
Securities Litigation and the Housing Market Downturn, 35 J. CORP. L. 97, 100–01
& figs.1 & 2 (2009). In fact, many have suggested that the current economic downturn
is worse than the Great Depression. See Foreword: The Subprime Meltdown: Causes,
Consequences, and Solutions, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 257, 257 (2009); Jon Hilsenrath et
al., Worst Crisis Since ’30s, with No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1
(“This has been the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. There is no
question about it.”).
201. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(F).
202. See Kaye, supra note 72, at 603–04 (noting that the Obama administration
codified the economic substance doctrine as a “weapon in the arsenal against corporate
tax shelters”).
203. See supra Part IV.
204. See supra Part IV. To ensure that all losses are deferred, the Service does not
even allow shareholders to net losses against gains under § 356. See Rev. Rul. 68-23,
1968-1 C.B. 144. Because Revenue Ruling 74-515 viewed reorganization transactions
as a whole in order to invoke § 356, it initially seems appropriate to also analyze these
transactions as a whole for the purpose of determining the overall tax consequences of
the exchange. See supra note 161; Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(C). Such a position,
however, would be inconsistent with congressional intent to defer losses because it
would allow shareholders to recognize some of their losses by using them to offset their
gains. See Rev. Rul. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 144.
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to handle the loss—permanent disallowance or deferral.205 Permanent
disallowance would create an inequitable result to shareholders because
it would deprive them of the ability to obtain a tax benefit from their loss
due to a change in corporate form that was outside of their control.206
Thus, of these two possibilities, loss deferral is the fairest alternative that
upholds congressional intent to deny immediate recognition.207
Given deferral as the appropriate treatment for unrecognized losses, it
remains to be determined whether a shareholder’s ability to allocate
specific consideration to specific shares surrendered should be allowed
Revenue Ruling 68-23 sought to prevent the netting effect that would result if
reorganization transactions were viewed as a whole for the purpose of determining the
amount of gain recognized when a shareholder exchanges some target shares solely for
cash and other target shares solely for acquiring stock. See id. In Revenue Ruling
68-23, the shareholder had 1000 shares in target stock valued at $505 each. Id. Six
hundred shares of the shareholder’s target stock had a basis of $495 per share (bloc 1),
and 400 shares of the shareholder’s target stock had a basis of $525 per share (bloc 2).
Id. Pursuant to a plan of reorganization, the shareholder traded each of his target shares
for acquiring shares valued at $500 each and $5 in cash. Id. In total, bloc 1 stock was
worth $303,000 and had a basis of $297,000 while bloc 2 stock was worth $202,000 and
had a basis of $210,000. Id. In exchange for bloc 1, the shareholder received acquiring
stock worth a total of $300,000 and $3000 in cash, realizing a gain of $6000. Id. In
exchange for bloc 2, the shareholder received acquiring stock worth a total of $200,000
and $2000 in cash, realizing a loss of $8000. Id.
Revenue Ruling 68-23 considered the transaction as a whole and therefore, because
both stock and boot were received, applied § 356. Id. Because Revenue Ruling 68-23
viewed the exchanges together as a single transaction in order to invoke § 356, it
reasonably follows that a single determination of realized gain or loss on the transaction
would result. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G)(3)(a). Thus, any realized gains on one
bloc of stock would be netted against any losses on the other. See id. Under the facts of
the ruling, if this approach were taken, the realized gain of $6000 on bloc 1 would be
netted against the realized loss of $8000 on bloc 2 resulting in an overall net loss of $2000. Id.
pt. X(B). According to § 356, this loss of $2000 would not be recognized. Id.
Revenue Ruling 68-23 did not adopt this approach, however. See Rev. Rul. 68-23,
1968-1 C.B. 144. The ruling required that the exchange of one bloc of shares be
evaluated under § 356 separate and apart from the exchange of the other bloc of shares.
Id. As a result, the gain of $6000 on bloc 1 was taxable to the extent of the $3000 cash
received, and the loss of $8000 on bloc 2 went unrecognized. Id. The ruling used this
approach to deny shareholders the ability to offset gains with losses, which would
facilitate an immediate recognition of some of their losses. See id. In effect, this ruling
saw one integrated transaction for the purpose of determining § 356 applicability, but it
saw separate transactions for the purpose of implementing the mechanics of § 356. See
Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(B). Construing § 356 in this somewhat strained and arguably
inconsistent way strongly suggests that congressional intent behind the enactment of
§ 356 was to ensure that all losses in these reorganization transactions were deferred
rather than currently recognized. See id. pt. X(G), § 3(a).
205. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G).
206. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
207. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2).
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or disregarded in favor of pro rata allocation.208 Pro rata allocation of
the boot is more practical because it enables shareholders to preserve
their loss in the basis of the shares directly exchanged for their loss
shares.209 It is also consistent with the treatment of boot in other loss
nonrecognition Code sections, and it is safe from scrutiny under the
economic substance doctrine.210
Allocation of boot on a pro rata basis would be consistent with the
treatment of boot in § 351 nonrecognition exchanges pursuant to Revenue
Ruling 68-55.211 According to this ruling, the shareholder must allocate
the fair market value of each category of consideration received from the
corporation, including boot, separately to each asset transferred in
proportion to the relative fair market values of the transferred assets.212
If the shareholder realizes a loss with respect to any asset, the loss goes
unrecognized.213 However, because the shareholder exchanges each loss
asset for at least some stock or other nonrecognition property in a § 351
transaction, the shareholder can nevertheless preserve the unrecognized
loss by adding basis in excess of the cash received to the stock or other
nonrecognition property for which the loss shares were exchanged.214
If a shareholder allocated boot on a pro rata basis in § 356 exchanges,
in addition to Revenue Ruling 68-55 consistency, a shareholder could
defer losses with relative conceptual ease. 215 The shareholder would
208. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G), § 1.
209. See id.
210. See id. pt. X(G), § 2.
211. See Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
212. See id.
213. See id. According to Revenue Ruling 68-55, in determining the amount of
gain recognized under § 351(b) when several assets are transferred to a corporation, each
asset must be considered as separately transferred in exchange for a portion of each
category of consideration received. See id. The reason that each transferred asset is
considered to be separately exchanged is to avoid the possibility of netting gains and
losses. See id. If the combined tax basis of all of the various assets transferred is simply
subtracted from the total fair market value of the total consideration received, in effect
shareholders could recognize specific asset losses in a § 351 transaction by offsetting
them against specific asset gains. See id. Such a result would clearly contravene
§ 351(b)(2)’s prohibition on loss recognition in § 351 transactions. See id.
214. See id.; I.R.C. § 358(a) (2006).
215. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2). For example, suppose a
shareholder has forty target shares of stock, each with a fair market value of $30.
Twenty shares have a basis of $20 (gain shares), and twenty have a basis of $40 (loss
shares). In a reorganization transaction, the shareholder surrenders his target stock in
exchange for $400 and forty shares of acquiring stock, each worth $20. If the cash boot
and the acquiring stock were allocated to the target shares on a pro rata basis, each target
share would be exchanged for $10 and one acquiring share. Under § 356, the
shareholder must recognize a $200 gain on the gain shares because the shareholder
received $200 in boot on those shares while also having an overall realized gain of $200
on their surrender. See I.R.C. § 356 (2006). The shareholder would also take a $400
basis in the acquiring shares. See id. § 358. With regard to the loss shares, the
shareholder is unable to recognize the $200 realized loss. See id. § 356. The shareholder
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exchange each target share for some acquiring shares and some boot,
and the shareholder would simply preserve any loss incurred on target
loss shares by taking the same basis in the new acquiring shares as the
basis in the loss shares exchanged, subject to certain adjustments to
account for the boot.216 This direct relationship between the basis of
surrendered target loss shares and the acquiring shares is much simpler
to grasp than the relationship where the basis of the target loss shares is
preserved indirectly in acquiring shares exchanged for other target shares as
would be the case under a basis-shifting method.217
A pro rata allocation of boot also shields § 356 transactions from
attack under the economic substance doctrine.218 Permitting shareholders to
arbitrarily choose their own method of allocation not only defeats the
purpose of § 356 in most circumstances but also lacks any foundation in
economic substance and has no business purpose other than tax
avoidance.219 According to the economic substance doctrine provided in
§ 7701(o)(1), a shareholder’s transaction will only have economic
substance if there is a substantial business purpose220 for the transaction
and the shareholder’s economic position changes in a meaningful way as
a result of the transaction.221 In a corporate reorganization where the
shareholder receives both stock and boot from the acquiring corporation
in exchange for his target shares, the shareholder typically does not give
is able to preserve the loss by taking a basis in the acquiring shares received equal to the
excess basis in the loss shares over the boot received. See id. § 358. Thus, the
shareholder takes a $600 basis in the new acquiring shares received for the loss shares
surrendered even though they are only worth $400 at the time of the exchange. See id.
In this way, the shareholder recognizes his $200 deferred loss upon subsequent sale of
these acquiring shares, thereby divesting his interest in this portion of the investment.
See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2).
216. See I.R.C. § 358. To account for boot, the shareholder must decrease the
exchanged basis by the amount of boot received and then increase the basis by the
amount of gain recognized on the exchange. See id.
217. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2).
218. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G); I.R.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. IV 2010).
219. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(E).
220. See I.R.C. § 7701(o). In Gregory v. Helvering, for example, a corporation
wholly owned by a taxpayer transferred 1000 shares of stock of another corporation to a
new corporation. 293 U.S. 465, 467 (1935). The new corporation then transferred all of
these shares to the taxpayer in complete liquidation. Id. The taxpayer then sold the
shares and reported the gain as capital gain. Id. The Court found that although in form
the transaction met the requirements to qualify as a reorganization, in substance the
transaction was merely an elaborate scheme to diminish taxes by avoiding dividend
treatment. See id. at 269–70. Because the transaction lacked a legitimate business
purpose, it could not be upheld as a proper reorganization. Id.
221. I.R.C. § 7701(o).
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separate consideration for each target share surrendered.222 Therefore,
other than tax avoidance, no reason justifies a shareholder’s artificial
allocation of consideration to separate shares.223
It is important to note that the economic substance doctrine does not
apply where Congress actually intended for taxpayers to recognize a tax
benefit by structuring a transaction in a certain way.224 Congress did not
intend § 356, however, to provide a tax benefit to shareholders.225 On
the contrary, Congress intended § 356 to be an anti-abuse provision to
ensure that a shareholder could not arbitrarily split up a whole transaction
and reconstitute it as several separate transactions in order to immediately
recognize a loss that lacked economic reality, and also to ensure that a
shareholder’s boot was taxed to the extent of any gain and as a dividend
if the boot had the effect of a dividend.226 Therefore, because Congress
created § 356 not with the intent to provide a tax benefit but rather with
the intent to prevent abuse, applying the economic substance doctrine to
shareholder allocations of stock in reorganization exchange transactions
is appropriate.227 This doctrine provides further support for the view that
Congress never intended shareholders to have the discretion to arbitrarily
allocate shares to avoid § 356 treatment.228
Finally, pro rata distributions of boot are already common practice in
corporate reorganizations.229 Shimberg v. United States highlighted this
in adopting a prereorganization approach to determine when boot in a
reorganization should be treated as a dividend.230 The court noted that as
a consequence of this approach, boot would be treated as a dividend any
time the distribution was pro rata.231 Nevertheless, the court assumed that
222. Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Errol G. Golub, “Boot” in Reorganizations—The Dividend Equivalency
Test of Section 356(a)(2), 58 TAXES 904, 905 (1980). One of Congress’s concerns was
that without § 356, corporations might be able to “siphon off” accumulated earnings and
profits at capital gains rates as opposed to ordinary income rates through a
reorganization. Id.; see also Trenholme J. Griffin, Treatment of Cash Distributions to
Shareholders Pursuant to a Corporate Reorganization: Shimburg v. United States, 20
B.C. L. REV. 601, 613–14 (1979) (“Section 356 was intended to prevent a corporation
from bailing out retained earnings when there is no meaningful reduction in the
shareholders’ equity interest in the corporation.”); Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 742
(1989).
226. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
227. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G).
228. See id.
229. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 738–39 (quoting Clark v. Comm’r, 828 F.2d 221, 227
(4th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 489 U.S. 726).
230. See Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1978); Golub,
supra note 225, at 911.
231. See Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 289; Golub, supra note 225, at 911. The
prereorganization approach results in automatic dividend treatment because if target
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Congress intended this, stating that “it follows that a pro rata distribution
of ‘boot’ to shareholders of one of the participating corporations must
certainly have the ‘effect of the distribution of a dividend’ within the
meaning of § 356(a)(2).”232 Even though the court stated that its
prereorganization approach did not establish an “automatic dividend”
rule in all cases, the emphasis the court placed on the effect that its
prereorganization approach would have on pro rata distributions suggests
that pro rata distributions were prevalent in corporate reorganizations.233
The Court in Clark also recognized this, noting that “corporate boot is
usually distributed pro rata to the shareholders of the target corporation.”234
Although Shimberg and Clark recognize the possibility that boot may
not always be distributed on a pro rata basis, the frequency with which
boot is distributed in this way supports the position that mandatory pro
rata distribution should be adopted because it will assist taxpayers in
determining how to treat their losses under § 356 in reorganization
transactions and will not be difficult to enforce.235
B. Loss Deferral and Basis-Shifting
Another alternative to accomplish loss deferral, albeit a more complicated
and less desirable alternative to pro rata allocation, is basis-shifting.236
shareholders receive their boot on a pro rata basis from the target corporation before the
merger, their percentage ownership in the target corporation will remain the same. See
Clark, 489 U.S. at 739–40. Therefore, the shareholders would not experience a
meaningful reduction in their interest in the corporation to qualify the boot for capital
gains treatment under § 302(b)(2). See id.
232. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288 (quoting King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418
F.2d 511, 521 (Ct. Cl. 1969)); Golub, supra note 225, at 911.
233. See Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 290; Golub, supra note 225, at 911.
234. See Clark, 489 U.S. at 738–39 (quoting Clark, 828 F.2d at 227).
235. See supra notes 229–34 and accompanying text.
236. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2). Under a basis-shifting approach,
the basis for the loss shares will be shifted to the basis of acquiring shares for which the
loss shares were not directly exchanged. See id. One reason that the Treasury Department
may be hesitant to enforce the basis-shifting approach is that when a shareholder
surrenders all of his shares solely for cash and basis-shifting, rather than applying
immediate recognition, the basis may shift to shares that the shareholder does not
control. See id. For example, consider a shareholder who surrenders all of his target
stock in a corporate reorganization and receives a redemption that has the effect of a
dividend under family attribution rules. This shareholder would be unable to use the
redemption to recover his basis in the target stock surrendered and moreover unable to
preserve the basis by shifting it to any remaining target stock that may have been retained
because, in this case, the shareholder has surrendered all of his target stock. See id.
This is very similar to the issue faced by the shareholder in Coyle v. United States, 415
F.2d 488, 493 (4th Cir. 1968). In Coyle, the court suggested that the shareholder could
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The proposed 2009 regulations insist on allowing shareholders freedom
to arbitrarily choose how to allocate the consideration they receive from
the acquiring corporation to each target share.237 Thus, despite the pro rata
method’s ease of application and its harmony with the economic substance
doctrine, basis-shifting should also be explored as an alternative method
to achieving loss deferral that is nevertheless compatible with non-pro
rata allocations of consideration.238 Under this method, if a shareholder
allocates solely acquiring stock to his low-basis target shares and allocates
solely cash to his high-basis target shares, the shareholder’s loss can be
preserved by shifting the loss incurred on the high-basis target shares to
the basis in the acquiring shares the shareholder received in exchange for
his low-basis target shares, even though the shareholder technically
exchanged his high-basis target shares solely for cash.239
If the Treasury Department were to adopt basis-shifting as a sanctioned
method for addressing losses, congressional intent to defer losses could
preserve his basis by adding it to the basis in the shares of related persons. See id.
However, taxpayers who want to benefit from their basis themselves rather than
relinquish it to a relative may find this result undesirable. See Gallagher, supra note 50,
pt. IV(G)(2).
Fortunately, this concern is inapplicable to a transaction in which the shareholder
receives both acquiring stock and cash in exchange for his target shares. See id. In such
a transaction, a shareholder will never end up without any acquiring stock to shift excess
basis to. See id. Even if a shareholder chooses to allocate solely cash to some of this
target stock and solely acquiring stock to his other target stock, the shareholder will still
be able to transfer the basis in excess of the cash received on the stock-for-cash exchange
to the basis in the acquiring stock received in the stock-for-stock exchange. See id.
237. Proposed 2009 Regulations, supra note 34, at 3512.
238. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G)(3)(b).
239. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2). For example, assume a shareholder
owns five shares of stock with a basis of $10 per share and five shares of stock with a
basis of $30 per share. Each share is worth $20. Pursuant to a reorganization, the
shareholder surrenders his stock in target for twenty shares of acquiring stock, each
worth $5 and $100 in cash. The shareholder allocates the twenty shares of acquiring to
his low-basis target shares and allocates the $100 to his high-basis target shares. Under
§ 356, the shareholder will not recognize the $50 gain on the low-basis shares, nor will
the shareholder recognize the $50 loss on the high-basis shares. See I.R.C. § 356 (2006).
Because the shareholder only allocated acquiring shares to the low-basis shares, the
shareholder recognizes no gain on this exchange, and the acquiring shares take the
exchange basis of the shareholder’s low-basis target shares, thus taking a total basis of
$50. See id. §§ 356, 358(a). Because the shareholder allocated only cash to the highbasis shares yet will not recognize any loss on these shares under § 356, it follows that
the consideration received for the high-basis shares would take the same exchanged basis
of these target shares, taking a total basis of $150. See id. The $100 given in cash,
however, cannot take a basis of $150 in order to defer the loss. See Gallagher, supra
note 50, pt. IV(G). The loss could still nonetheless be deferred by adding the basis in
excess of the cash received for the high-basis target shares surrendered to the new basis
in the acquiring shares received in exchange for the low-basis target shares. See id. In
this example, the basis in the loss shares exceeds the $100 cash received by $50. This
excess basis could be added to the acquiring shares, giving these shares a total basis of
$100 in order to preserve the $50 loss by reducing future gain on the shares. See id.
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be satisfied in form.240 In substance, however, shareholders could still
minimize gain recognition and currently recognize losses through
strategic allocations without substantially diminishing their investment
interest.241 A shareholder could, for instance, allocate substantially all of
the boot plus only a small amount of acquiring shares to his high-basis
target loss shares.242 The shareholder would then preserve the loss in
this small amount of acquiring shares and could subsequently sell the
shares to recognize an immediate loss.243
This result would be inconsistent with the spirit of congressional
intent to defer losses through § 356.244 In such a scenario, basis-shifting
only creates a more complex path for shareholders to follow in order to
secure immediate loss recognition than if basis recovery and identification
were determined using a simple share-by-share approach.245 Pro rata
allocation, on the other hand, more closely adheres to the congressional
intent to defer losses underpinning § 356 without leaving room for
shareholders determined to recognize immediate losses to maneuver
their way around its effects.246 Thus, of the two approaches to loss
deferral where a shareholder exchanges target shares for both acquiring
shares and boot, the pro rata allocation method is not only the most
practical method but also the most effective method in achieving the
intended loss deferral objective.247
240. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2).
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. Building upon the example in note 239, assume that instead of
allocating all twenty acquiring shares to the shareholder’s low-basis target shares and the
entire $100 to his high-basis target shares, the shareholder allocates nineteen acquiring
shares and $5 to his low-basis target shares surrendered and allocates one acquiring share
and $95 to his high-basis target shares surrendered. Under this allocation scheme, the
shareholder only recognizes $5 of the $50 gain on his low-basis target shares
surrendered. See I.R.C. § 356. The shareholder still will not recognize any of the $50
loss on his high-basis target shares, but all of the loss can be preserved in the one
acquired share received for his high-basis target shares. See id. § 358(a). Before their
surrender, the shareholder’s total basis in his five high-basis target shares was $150, and
after calculating the excess of this basis over the $95 cash included in exchange for his
high-basis target shares, the one new acquiring share would take on a $55 basis even
though it only has a fair market value of $5. See id. The shareholder could then sell this
acquiring share without substantially diminishing his interest in the acquiring corporation
and recognize the $50 loss that § 356 disallowed. See Gallagher, supra note 50, pt.
IV(G).
244. See supra Part IV.
245. Gallagher, supra note 50, pt. IV(G)(2).
246. See supra Part VI.A.
247. See Schler, supra note 3, pt. X(G).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The proposed 2009 regulations allow shareholders to split transactions
and treat stock-for-stock exchanges separately from stock-for-cash
exchanges so as to avoid the requirements of § 356 altogether and
recognize an immediate loss on the loss shares they exchange.248 This
proposed solution, however, undermines congressional intent to defer
losses and is too generous to some shareholders because it enables them
to take immediate losses on some of their shares where, in totality, they
have an overall gain.249 A statement made by the court in Jordan Marsh
Co. v. Commissioner accurately sums up the congressional intent
underlying § 356 and similar nonrecognition provisions.250 In that case,
quoting Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, the court stated that the
purpose of nonrecognition was to prevent the taxpayer from immediately
recognizing gain or claiming a loss in certain transactions “where gain or
loss may have accrued in a constitutional sense, but where in a popular
and economic sense there has been a mere change in the form of
ownership and the taxpayer has not really ‘cashed in’ on the theoretical
gain, or closed out a losing venture.”251 In finding that nonrecognition,
where applicable, was mandatory rather than optional, the court went on
to say that nonrecognition was intended so that “as to both gains and
losses the taxpayer should not have it within his power to avoid the
operation of the section by stipulating for the addition of cash, or boot,
to property received in exchange.”252
The proposed 2009 regulations’ loophole to loss nonrecognition goes
against congressional intent and will substantially widen the tax gap, as
the DIVX-SNIC example illustrates.253 Many shareholders who purchased
shares prior to 2008 will possess significant built-in losses when
entering into reorganizations and will attempt to immediately recognize
248. See Proposed 2009 Regulations, supra note 34, at 3512.
249. See supra Part IV; supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
250. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm’r, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1958) (quoting
Portland Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940)).
251. See id. (quoting Portland Oil Co., 109 F.2d at 488) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Jordan Marsh Co., the petitioner conveyed two parcels of property to a
vendee in exchange for $2,300,000 and leases on the same property for terms of about
thirty years. Id. at 453–54. The petitioner claimed that the transaction was a sale and
took a deduction on its tax return in the amount of the difference between the adjusted
basis on the property and the cash received. Id. at 454. The Commissioner disallowed
the deduction, claiming that the transaction constituted a nonrecognition like-kind
exchange. Id. The court agreed with the petitioner in finding that the transaction
qualified as a sale rather than a like-kind exchange because the petitioner received cash
reflecting the full value of the property and took on a new liability to make annual rental
payments on the property. Id. at 456–58. Therefore, the petitioner closed out on a losing
venture and its economic position was changed as a result of the transaction. Id. at 456.
252. See id. at 456.
253. See supra notes 15–36, 188 and accompanying text.
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these losses while deferring gains because of this loophole.254 This will
prevent the Service from collecting a substantial amount of tax revenue
that could otherwise help reduce the federal budget deficit.255 Deferral
of loss, on the other hand, both protects against contrived transaction
structuring by shareholders for tax avoidance purposes and preserves
congressional intent to defer losses in corporate reorganizations.256
Requiring shareholders to allocate boot in § 356 transactions on a pro
rata basis is the fairest and most practical way to accomplish deferral
because shareholders can preserve any unrecognized target share losses
in the tax basis of the newly acquired shares for which their surrendered
target shares were directly exchanged.257 Pro rata allocation of boot is
also consistent with the treatment of boot in § 351 transactions, and it is
safe from scrutiny under the economic substance doctrine.258 Although a
shareholder could also defer loss recognition through basis-shifting, this
method would result in a practical circumvention of § 356 if transactionsplitting, as permitted under the proposed 2009 regulations, is allowed.259
Thus, the Treasury Department should close this loophole by modifying
the proposed 2009 regulations to conform more closely to congressional
intent requiring mandatory § 356 application and loss deferral when
shareholders exchange target stock for both acquiring stock and cash in a
reorganization.260

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
See supra Part VI.
See supra Part VI.A.
See supra Part VI.A.
See supra Part VI.B.
See supra Part VI.A.
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